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1. Introduction 
 
There is a success element to seeing, or at least to seeing conceived in a very familiar way. If 
I see a cat, under this conception, then a cat must be there before me. But I could seem to see 
a cat even if no cat were there. To deal with this a certain concept of a visual experience is 
commonly introduced. The idea is that if for me it is just as if I am seeing a cat then this will 
be so in virtue of my having a visual experience of a certain kind. It will be an experience 
such that it looks to me just as if a cat is before me. I could have such an experience when 
seeing a cat and I could have such an experience (indeed, the very same experience) when 
merely hallucinating a cat. Obviously then having an experience, so understood, is not 
sufficient for seeing a cat. According to the standard causal theory of perception, if I see a 
cat then that cat must be there before me and my having an experience of the right kind must 
be caused, in some appropriate way, by its being there before me. I shall call the conception 
of experience that is part of this picture the traditional conception. It figures in key writings 
on causation and perception and is still very widely held. (See Grice 1961, Strawson 1974, 
1979, Pears 1976, Searle 1983 and many others subsequently.) Over the last twenty to thirty 
years or so, this conception has been subjected to criticism by philosophers who advance, or 
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who are at least sympathetic towards, a disjunctive conception of experience.1 We shall come 
to the details presently. The main critical target of disjunctivists is the following assumption: 
 
Subjects who on seeing X/an F/something G have an experience such that it looks to them 
just as if X/an F/something G is there could have the very same experience if they were 
merely hallucinating X/an F/something G.  
 
The disjunctivist holds, by contrast, that perceptual experiences—the experiences we have 
when perceiving worldly objects—and merely hallucinatory experiences, are different in 
kind. The former are intrinsically encounters with worldly objects; the latter are not. Despite 
recent interest it is fair to say that neither disjunctivism itself nor the dispute between 
disjunctivists and traditionalists has secured a firm place in mainstream theory of 
knowledge.2 My aim here is to distil out some points of real importance from disjunctivist 
thinking. I find that for many philosophers the disjunctivist stance is puzzling or at least 
under-motivated. By laying out key elements of the stance clearly I hope to make them less 
puzzling. I also aim to show that it is possible to take on board what is right in the stance, 
while still making sense of our having perceptual knowledge of objects, scenes and events in 
keeping with the traditional conception. There is a price to be paid for this accommodation: 
we need to abandon the idea that experiences can bear the explanatory burden that 
disjunctivists have placed on them. They have a role in accounting for perceptual knowledge. 
That much is obvious. But this role is part of a wider picture that can incorporate the 
                                                
1 See Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1980-81, 1990 and 2002, McDowell 1982, 1986 and 1995, Hyman 1992 and 1994, 
Child 1994, Putnam 1994, Brewer 1999, Williamson 2000, Campbell 2002, Martin 2004. Child’s discussion 
contains a lucid overview of earlier thinking. 
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traditional conception. The upshot is that at least on epistemological matters the gap between 
traditionalists and disjunctivists can be narrowed. 
 
2. Disjunctive analyses 
 
A good place to start is Paul Snowdon’s attack on a familiar argument for the standard causal 
theory of perception. (Snowdon:1980/81; 1990) The familiar argument rests on examples 
designed to show that having an experience such that it is just as if an F is before one, when 
there is an F before one, is not sufficient for perceiving an F (Grice 1961, Pears 1976). The 
examples are of imagined scenarios in which the subject has a veridical hallucination—a 
hallucinatory experience such that, coincidentally or by some devious contrivance, things are 
as they appear to the subject. What is missing from the examples, we are invited to conclude, 
is an appropriate causal chain linking the object, scene, or event in question to the having of 
the experience. Snowdon’s main move is to argue that the conception of experience 
presupposed by this way of thinking—what I have called the traditional conception—is not 
mandatory.  
Here I am looking at cat, which as it happens is curled up on the sofa, with light shining 
in from a window on my left. Various looks-specifications apply to me in this situation, 
including along with many others: it looks to … just as if a cat is there; it looks to … as if a 
cat is curled up on the sofa; it looks to … as if light is shining in from a window on my left. 
Now consider the hallucinatory counterpart to my current experience—a possible 
hallucinatory experience e such that every looks-specification that applies to me in virtue of 
my current visual experience would also apply to me in virtue of my having e, and vice versa. 
                                                
2 I am judging here from the contents of recent anthologies and introductory works in epistemology. Critical 
discussions can be found in Robinson 1990 and 1994, P. Smith 1990/91, Millar 1996, Sturgeon 2000, Foster 
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What Snowdon thinks open to dispute is that my actual experience and its hallucinatory 
counterpart would be one and the same experience. This may initially look like a startling 
move, at least to those schooled in the traditional conception, since sameness with respect to 
the applicability of looks-specifications might seem to guarantee sameness of experience. But 
the whole point of Snowdon’s move is to resist the idea that it is obvious that the experiences 
under consideration—perceptual experiences and their hallucinatory counterparts—are 
individuated by how it looks to the subject as if things are. Drawing upon an earlier 
discussion by J. M. Hinton (1973), he argues that there is a disjunctive account of looks-
judgements (judgements in which a looks-specification is applied to a subject) that does not 
presuppose that experiences are so individuated. Here is one way in which he captures the 
disjunctive account: 
 
[L]ooks-judgements are made true by two types of occurrence: in hallucinations they are 
made true by some feature of a (non-object-involving) inner experience, whereas in 
perceptions they are made true by some feature of a certain relation to an object, a non-
inner experience, (which does not involve such an inner experience). (Snowdon 1990: 
130) 
 
The view can be refined to accommodate a wider range of disjuncts. The idea is that the 
judgement that it looks to me just as if a cat is curled up on the sofa might be made true either 
by my seeing a cat on the sofa, or by my seeing on the sofa something looking as if it is a cat, 
or by my hallucinating a cat on a sofa, or by … .3 A merely hallucinatory experience of a cat 
                                                
2000, Ayers 2002, A. D. Smith 2002, Johnston 2004, Thau 2004, Fish 2005. 
3 Note that the notion of looks figuring in the open-ended disjunction of situations that might make it true that it 
looks to me as if a cat is on the sofa is not the same as the notion of looks in the statement for which the 
disjunction is supplying possible truth-makers. 
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on a sofa—one that does not involve any perceptual encounter with objects—would be a non-
object-involving inner experience. Seeing a cat on the sofa would be a non-inner 
experience—an experience that consists in a perceptual encounter with objects. Crucially, we 
are not to think of the having of an experience that consists in an encounter with objects as 
decomposable into the having of an inner non-object-involving experience plus the obtaining 
of a suitable causal relation between objects and the having of that inner experience.  
I have so far left out of account an element of Snowdon’s picture that is important for his 
purposes. The causal theory that he considers is a partial conceptual analysis of seeing. 
According to the theory, so understood, it is built into the ordinary notion of seeing an F that 
people see an F only if they have a certain kind of (inner) experience standing in an 
appropriate causal relation to an F.  If the theory were correct then, it would seem that, in 
order to understand what it is to see an F we would need first to understand what it is for it to 
look to one just as if an F is there. That looks implausible. The most natural way to explain 
the notion of its looking to a subject just as if an F is there is by reference to cases in which 
the subject sees an F. (This is how I introduced the notion above.) If you know what it’s like 
to see an F then you can grasp the idea of its being for you just as if you see an F, irrespective 
of whether you do.4 This latter idea is just the idea of its looking to you as if an F is there. 
Now, if the notion of its looking to one just as if an F is there is conceptually dependent on 
the notion of seeing an F, then it is hard to see how the latter notion can be given a conceptual 
analysis in terms of the former. It is a further matter, however, whether this problem provides 
a reason to reject the view that the experience you have as you look at an F and the 
hallucinatory counterpart of that experience could be one and the same experience. For even 
if the concept of seeing an F is conceptually prior to the notion of its looking to one just as if 
an F is there, it could be that part of what is happening when one sees an F is that one has an 
                                                
4 For a somewhat similar line of thought, see Child 1994: 144.  
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experience under the traditional conception. Indeed, it could be that the best explanation for 
the phenomenon of seeing is in terms of a theory that posits such experiences. 
 
3. Intermediaries 
 
What I have called Snowdon’s main move does not, and is not meant to, provide a reason for 
rejecting the traditional conception. It sets out what seems to be a coherent way of thinking of 
the experiences implicated in perception on which those experiences are not individuated in 
terms of looks-specifications. The point is that if the view is coherent then its availability 
suggests that we may not infer, without further ado, from 
 
(i) Every looks-specification that would apply to a subject A in virtue of A’s having 
experience e1 would apply to A in virtue of A’s having e2, and vice versa, 
 
to 
 
(ii) e1 and e2 are one and the same experience. 
 
From Snowdon’s standpoint, for all that (i) tells us, e1 might be intrinsically an encounter 
with an object and e2 might be a mere hallucination. In that case e1 and e2 would, for 
Snowdon, be different experiences. e1 would be essentially relational since to have it is to 
stand in a relation to some object or objects; e2 would not be. Given that traditionalists 
acknowledge that seeing, in the success sense, is intrinsically an encounter with objects, it 
might seem that the issue here is purely terminological. While traditionalists recruit the term 
‘experience’ for something the having of which falls short of constituting seeing, the friends 
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of disjunctivism use the term for something that constitutes seeing. But the issue is not purely 
terminological. It is crucial to the thinking that lies behind disjunctivism that seeing, as a 
perceptual encounter with worldly objects, does not implicate any inner experiential state that 
could also be had when not encountering such objects. 
Why should it be thought that the disjunctivist conception of experience, and the related 
conception of experiences in perception as essentially relational, is to be preferred to the 
traditional conception? There is no doubt that an important source of motivation is the 
thought that there is no prospect of giving a plausible account of perceptual knowledge in 
terms of the traditional conception. It is this source that is the focus of the present discussion.  
One way of giving expression to the supposed problem is in terms of the idea that the 
traditional conception, in one way or another, takes our perceptual encounters with the world 
to involve intermediaries. The worry is that if perception directly acquaints us only with 
intermediaries that interpose between us and the world, then it is difficult to see how we can 
have epistemic access to what lies beyond them. John McDowell links the invocation of 
intermediaries to a certain ‘tempting’ line of thought that he represents as a version of the 
argument from illusion. Suppose that we have a capacity to tell by experience that such-and-
such is so. The tempting line is as follows: 
 
In a deceptive case, what is embraced within the scope of experience is an appearance 
that such-and-such is the case, falling short of the fact: a mere appearance. So what is 
experienced in a non-deceptive case is a mere appearance too. The upshot is that even in 
the non-deceptive cases we have to picture something that falls short of the fact 
ascertained, at best defeasibly connected with it, as interposing itself between the 
experiencing subject and the fact itself. (McDowell 1982/1998: 386). 
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This is not so much a determinate line of thought as a schema for a certain style of argument. 
It is meant to cover, among others, arguments that apply to situations in which the 
problematic character of perception is not at issue. Indeed, in the article from which the 
passage is drawn McDowell is primarily concerned with the epistemological problem of 
other minds. From looking at Sally’s behaviour I might judge that she is anxious. Suppose 
that she is. According to the tempting line, since Sally might have displayed the same 
behaviour even if she had not been anxious, the behaviour is a ‘highest common factor’ 
between the actual case, in which Sally is anxious, and a deceptive case in which she displays 
the same behaviour but is not anxious. So, the argument goes, it cannot be the case that my 
perceptual experience as I look at Sally embraces the fact that she is anxious. At best my 
experience embraces something that falls short of this fact—the fact that she displays the 
behaviour in question, and thus appears to be anxious. In this example the intermediary is not 
something interposing between the subject and the world. It is a worldly appearance—Sally’s 
appearing in virtue of her behaviour to be anxious—conceived as being perceptually 
accessible to the subject and yet interposing itself between the subject and something that lies 
out of direct perceptual reach—Sally’s actually being anxious. But McDowell clearly takes a 
further application of the schema to lead to the conclusion that no worldly facts are embraced 
by perceptual experience and no worldly objects picked out directly by perceptual 
consciousness. This is explicit in the following passage: 
 
If the object of experience is in general a mere appearance, as the ‘highest common 
factor’ model makes it, then it is not clear how … we could save ourselves from having to 
picture it as getting in the way between the subject and the world. (McDowell 1982/1998: 
388.)5 
                                                
5 See also the same article on pp. 392-93.  
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If this is right no perceptual experience can embrace a worldly object, since the having of any 
such experience is compatible with the absence of any such object. So no such experience 
can embrace facts about worldly objects either. Looking at the cat my current experience 
cannot embrace it or the fact that something before me so much as looks like a cat. As 
McDowell puts it in another place, ‘subjectivity is confined to a tract of reality whose layout 
would be exactly as it is however things stood outside it, and the commonsense notion of a 
vantage point on the external world is now fundamentally problematic’ (1986/1998: 241).  
McDowell thinks the tempting line of thought, in all its forms, can be resisted with the 
help of a disjunctive conception of appearances, according to which ‘an appearance that 
such-and-such is the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact that such-and-such is 
the case making itself perceptually manifest to someone’ (McDowell 1982/1998: 386-87). 
My immediate concern is not with this particular version of disjunctivism but with whether 
the traditionalist is committed to positing the intermediaries that are taken to make perceptual 
knowledge problematic.6 Applied to perceptual cases generally, the tempting line looks rather 
like arguments that were used for the conclusion that in perceptual experience we encounter, 
not physical objects, but sense-data, where these are conceived as something inner. (This is 
not surprising given that McDowell takes it to be a version of the argument from illusion.) It 
is open to traditionalists, however, to reject the idea that they are committed to positing 
sense-data in this sense. The bottom line for the traditionalist is that for any case of seeing an 
F there is a hallucinatory counterpart in which a subject has exactly the same experience and 
yet does not see an F. There is indeed a common factor in the two cases—one and the same 
experience is implicated. But the common factor so conceived is not a common object of 
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perception. (Millar 1996 deploys this consideration in a critical discussion of disjunctivism.) 
Even so, the traditionalist might seem to be committed to rejecting direct realism, the view 
that we can, and regularly do, perceive worldly objects directly and not via perception of 
something inner. For surely if seeing an F on some occasion implicates a certain experience, 
and if the having of that experience is compatible with not seeing an F, then seeing an F is in 
some sense mediated by the having of that experience. It matters though what is meant by 
‘mediated’. Traditionalists can make use of a distinction invoked by John Foster between 
psychological mediation and perceptual mediation (Foster 2000: 4-14). We have perceptual 
mediation when ‘the perceiving of one thing is wholly channelled through the perceiving of 
another’, that is, when one perceives X in virtue of the fact that one perceives Y (X ≠ Y), and 
certain additional facts (Foster 2000: 4, omitting refinements). By contrast, my perceiving X 
is psychologically mediated by my having an experience E, if my having E is not itself a state 
of perceiving X and the fact that I perceive X breaks down into the fact that I have E and 
certain additional facts. (Foster 2000: 10, again with refinements omitted.) Traditionalists 
must concede that perception of objects is psychologically mediated but their bottom line on 
experience does not commit them to holding that perception of worldly objects is 
perceptually mediated. Further, they may hold that while perceptual mediation involving 
perception of something inner may be epistemologically problematic, psychological 
mediation is epistemologically innocent and compatible with direct realism. 7  
                                                
6 In Millar (forthcoming) I explore the relationship between McDowell’s style of disjunctivism, which is 
formulated with epistemological issues in mind, and that of Snowdon for whom the focus is on the character of 
perceptual experience as an issue in the philosophy of mind. On this, see also Snowdon 2005. 
7 They will, however, resist the idea that they are Naïve Realists in Mike Martin’s sense. For Martin Naïve 
Realism is not simply the view that we perceive some objects in a perceptually unmediated manner; it entails 
that ‘[s]ome of the objects of perception—the concrete individuals, their properties, the events these partake 
in—are constituents of the experience’ (2004: 39). 
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This last move might seem a little too quick. The idea of perceptual mediation is quite a 
strong one. Sense-datum theorists who believe that perception of worldly objects is indirect 
need not be committed to thinking that our relation to the sense-data that play a mediating 
role is properly described as perceiving. They may think, for instance, that our awareness of 
our sense-data is to be distinguished from perception. It might be called direct apprehension.8 
The important issue, however, if whether sense-data are conceived as inner objects that are 
given to the experiencing subject as objects of consciousness—the only objects directly 
encountered when one perceives worldly objects. If they are then a variant of Foster’s 
distinction still has a point. What contrasts with psychological mediation might be called 
objectual mediation. Perception of X is objectually mediated if it is through direct 
apprehension of some other item that, provided certain additional facts obtain, the subject 
perceives X. It is open to traditionalists to plead not guilty to the charge that they are 
committed to thinking that perception of worldly objects is objectually mediated by direct 
apprehension of anything inner. Their view is that we perceive objects through having 
experiences, not through directly apprehending either the experiences or anything inner that 
is presented through having the experiences.9  
The approach just outlined will not satisfy critics of the traditional conception, however. 
Hilary Putnam argues that the direct realism accommodated by the standard causal theory is 
                                                
8 Note, however, that G. E. Moore (1953) used the term ‘direct apprehension’ and considered direct 
apprehension to be a form of perception. He also gives qualified approval to the view that sense-data are inner 
in that they occupy the private spaces of the minds of individuals. See especially 1953: ch. II and the beginning 
of ch. III. 
9 The view raises an issue about how to explain what makes sensory experiences conscious if not our being in 
some manner aware of them. Whether what makes a state conscious is the subject’s being aware of it is 
debatable. Traditionalists might adopt Fred Dretske’s view what makes states conscious is their enabling their 
subjects to be aware, or bringing it about that they seem to be aware, of something else. Dretske writes, ‘[M]y 
visual experience of a barn is conscious, not because I am introspectively aware of it … but because it (when 
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pretty thin beer and hardly worthy of the name. According to what he prefers to call natural 
realism—a view he finds in William James—‘successful perception is just a seeing, or 
hearing, or feeling, etc., of things “out there”, and not a mere affectation of a person’s 
subjectivity by those things’ (Putnam 1994: 454). This succinctly captures a thought that is a 
central focus of attention in the present discussion—that perceiving is not ‘a mere affectation 
of a person’s subjectivity’ by the presence of objects in the world around us.  
Those advancing Putnam’s critique face a challenge too. The challenge is to spell out 
what exactly is missing from an account of perception that explains seeing, for instance, just 
in terms of having a suitably caused visual experience. It is not enough to say that ‘successful 
[seeing] is just a seeing … of things “out there”’, since that is not something that 
traditionalists who adopt a causal theory of perception are committed to denying. Nor is it 
enough to add, as Putnam does in the same context, that seeing is not analysable. For that 
does not pinpoint what it is about seeing that is left out of account on the standard causal 
theory. We come closer to the intuition that drives Putnam’s critique with the second 
conjunct of the idea that he attributes to James in the following: 
 
James’s idea is that the traditional claim that we must conceive of our sensory 
experiences as intermediaries between us and the world has no sound arguments to 
support it, and, worse, makes it impossible to see how persons can be in genuine 
cognitive contact with a world at all. (Putnam 1994: 454)10 
 
                                                
brought about in the right way) makes me aware of the barn’ (1993: 280). I do not suggest that this is problem-
free but do not pursue the matter here. 
10 McDowell (1995/1998: 403) speaks of a ‘cognitive purchase on an objective fact’ in a passage designed to 
make us feel the oddity of theories of knowledge linked to the traditional conception. Scott Sturgeon (2000: 31) 
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Suppose it is conceded that the worry about intermediaries, as so far presented, can be met by 
acknowledging, in the spirit of Foster’s distinction, that while experiences mediate perception 
of objects psychologically, they do not do so objectually. Still, Putnam’s comment is 
suggestive of a more serious challenge to the traditionalist: to show how to reconcile the idea 
that perception is psychologically mediated with the idea that it enables us to make cognitive 
contact with the world. Of course, more needs to be said to make clear why it might be 
thought that psychological mediation is incompatible with cognitive contact. I turn to this in 
the next section and then explain the attraction of a relational conception of experience for 
those who place weight on the metaphor of cognitive contact. 
 
4. The significance of cognitive contact 
 
One source of the worry about genuine cognitive contact comes from linking the traditional 
conception to a particular way of thinking about knowledge. Suppose we think of knowledge 
as requiring justified true belief. Then we might wonder how it is that I acquire the 
knowledge that a cat is there as I look at the cat. For as I look it simply strikes me that a cat is 
there. My belief to this effect is not arrived at through a process of reasoning—it is not a 
conclusion from prior assumptions. That raises the question, ‘What provides the justification 
for my belief?’ A common answer is that the belief is justified because it is grounded in my 
current visual experience.11 But what if we think of my experience along the lines of the 
traditional conception? Under this conception it is possible to have the very experience I am 
having now when no cat is there. Suppose that my justification derived from having an 
experience so conceived. Then I could be in the same justificatory position as I am in now, in 
                                                
presents the disjunctivist’s account as one relying on the idea that veridical perception is ‘brute contact between 
mind and truth’. 
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the good situation in which I see the cat, if I was in a corresponding bad situation in which I 
have the same experience but no cat is there. With respect to justification there would be 
parity between the two situations.  
The foregoing remarks deal with a simple version of the view under consideration, 
according to which in the good situation my belief that a cat is there is justified simply in 
virtue of being based on my current visual experience. A more plausible view would 
recognise further factors bearing on the justificatory status of my belief. For instance, it might 
be held that the experience confers justification on my belief only so long as I have no reason 
to think that there are countervailing facts—facts that provide a reason not to take how it 
looks to me that things are as the way they are. But if the additional factors bearing on 
justification are ones that could obtain in a corresponding bad situation—one in which I have 
the same experience but no cat is there—there would be parity between that situation and the 
good situation with respect to justification. Why should we balk at this? 
This is where the metaphor of cognitive contact comes into play. Coming to know that p 
through, say, seeing that p, is coming into cognitive contact with the fact that p through the 
exercise of one’s visual-perceptual and recognitional capacities. Contact in virtue of seeing 
that p implies some real connection between the fact that p and one’s coming to believe that 
p. The trouble for the sort of view just outlined is that the fact that I am justified in believing 
that p in the good situation, and that it’s true that p in that situation, does not guarantee that 
there is a real connection between me and the fact that p. Essentially the same problem arises 
for any version of what McDowell (1995/1998) has called a hybrid conception of 
knowledge—a conception according to which true belief is turned into knowledge by the 
satisfaction of conditions which could be satisfied when the truth requirement for knowledge 
is not met. It arises, for instance, in thinking of perceptual knowledge in terms of true belief 
                                                
11 See for instance Pollock 1987: 175-79, Alston 1999, Audi 2003: 28.  
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formed via the operation of a belief-forming process of a sort that reliably yields true beliefs. 
There will be good situations and corresponding bad situations that are on a par with respect 
to the status conferred by the operation of the reliable process, so long as the process is 
individuated in such a way that it can be in operation in forming the belief that X is there 
when X is not there. (For theorists who favour a reliabilist view of justification this would, of 
course, amount to parity with respect to justification).  The fact that a belief is true, and has 
the status conferred by its having come about through the operation of the reliable process, 
does not guarantee that there is any cognitively relevant connection between having the belief 
and the fact that makes it true. The metaphor of cognitive contact helps to pin down what at 
least some critics of the traditional conception of experience think is wrong with that 
conception: when we try to account for perceptual knowledge in terms of that conception we 
cannot to justice to the metaphor.  
A very natural response to the problem is to build a causal condition into the account of 
knowledge, at least for cases of perceptual knowledge. Consider a variant of a much-used 
Gettier-type example. As I approach the open door of a house I seem to see Bill and, having 
no reason to think otherwise, believe that he is there before me. Unknown to me I am looking 
at a life-size photograph of him, but for a few moments it looks to me just as if he is standing 
in front of me. As it happens he is in front of me but hidden from view behind the 
photograph. If this is indeed a Gettier-type example then it has to be a case in which there is 
justified true belief but no knowledge. Certainly there is a sense in which it could be 
reasonable for me to believe that Bill in there in this situation. After all, momentarily it is just 
as if he is there and I might have no reason to suppose that there are any countervailing facts. 
If that is what it takes to be justified, I can be justified in this situation. It might be suggested 
that the explanation of why it is not a case of knowledge is that there is no causal connection 
between the presence of my friend and my having experiences such that it looks to me just as 
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if my friend is there. Cognitive contact, I said, requires connection. If there were an 
appropriate causal connection between the presence of Bill and my having the experiences, 
and between my having the experiences and forming the belief, then there would be a 
connection of a sort that looks relevant. The trouble now is that this will not, and should not, 
satisfy the critics of the traditional conception of experience. Requiring that a causal 
condition should be satisfied for perceptual knowledge looks like ad hoc stipulation in the 
absence of some account of why the satisfaction of the condition helps to explain why it is 
knowledge that is acquired. Apart from that, the insertion of causal conditions will seem to 
defenders of a relational conception of experience to put subjects at a distance from the world 
that is epistemologically problematic. If an experience that could be had in the absence of 
Bill psychologically mediates my seeing Bill then having it clearly does not suffice to make 
Bill available to me as an object of thought and knowledge. It is not clear how the fact that I 
am caused to have it by the presence of Bill can make Bill available to me as an object of 
thought and knowledge. Bill, after all, is the distal cause of my having the experience. Given 
a relational conception of experience there is no distance—Bill is a constituent of my 
experience in the good case. With this in mind even psychological mediation can seem to put 
us at a distance from the objects we know about perceptually.  
My aim now is further to understand this line of thought and thereby the appeal of the 
relational conception of experience that is part of the disjunctivist’s picture.  
 
5. Making sense of cognitive contact 
 
The idea I shall explore is that to make sense of perceptual knowledge, and why it should be 
thought to implicate cognitive contact as conceived by the disjunctivist, we need to take into 
account an intimate connection between perception and demonstrative judgement. Ways of 
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thinking about this connection, which are conducive to the disjunctivist standpoint, are 
variously explored by Gareth Evans (1982), John McDowell (1986), Paul Snowdon (1992), 
Bill Brewer (1999) and John Campbell (2002). Closely related themes are pursued by 
William Child (1994). I shall not attempt an exposition of their detailed lines of thought. I 
shall instead focus on the following claims: 
 
(A) Perceptual knowledge depends on being able to have de re thoughts about perceptually 
presented objects: we have to be able to think of such objects that they are such-and-
such. 
 
(B) The relevant thoughts are relational demonstrative thoughts that essentially depend on 
the presence of the objects they pick out: if I think of X that it is G, no thought would 
be that thought unless X was present.12 
 
(C) A correct account of the experiences implicated by perceptions of objects, scenes, and 
events must enable us to understand how it is that by means of those perceptions we are 
able to grasp certain demonstrative thoughts and make certain demonstrative 
judgements.  
 
                                                
12 There are conceptions of de re thoughts (e.g., Bach 1982) on which, considered psychologically, such 
thoughts are indexical and determine semantic content only through being had in a context. Under such views 
de re thoughts about a perceived object would not be relational demonstrative thoughts in the sense intended 
here. Pressure to resist the relational view of demonstrative thought comes from the assumption that a proper 
taxonomy of propositional attitudes would individuate them non-relationally. On this, see Fodor 1987: ch. 2. 
Relationalists, of course, reject this assumption. 
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(D) Condition (C) is met only if the experiences implicated in perception are, intrinsically, 
encounters with what is in the world around us. 
 
Assumption (A) is uncontroversial. Suppose that this time, approaching the open door in 
the setting that figured in the photograph case, I do see Bill and thereby come to know that he 
is there. My knowing that Bill is there by looking requires that my seeing him enables me to 
think of him as that such-and-such and as there. I need to be able to have de re thoughts 
about him and about that location—thoughts that are made possible by my seeing him..  
(B) links the relevant de re thought to a particular conception of demonstrative thought 
upon which disjunctivists rely. If I have the visual-perceptual demonstrative thought, That is 
Bill, it is essential to my having that very thought that it picks out a suitably located object—
one that my perception presents to be so located. Were there no object so presented I would 
not be having that very thought even though I could give expression to my current state of my 
mind by saying, ‘That is Bill’. Linked to this view is a disjunctive account of the mentality 
given expression by sincere utterances of sentences like, ‘That is Bill’. Someone who 
sincerely utters, ‘That is X’ might be giving expression to a demonstrative judgement, That is 
X, and thereby pick out an object, or might be giving expression to a deceptive counterpart of 
such a judgement—a distinct state of which it is not true that it picks out X. (Cf. McDowell 
1986.) This approach to demonstrative judgement is controversial. But since my aim is to see 
whether disjunctivist thinking that incorporates it can be squared with a traditional 
conception of experience, I shall take it for granted in what follows.  
(C) is uncontroversial given (B). We are interested in how perceiving an object makes it 
possible to have demonstrative thoughts about that object. An acceptable account of the 
experiences implicated on some occasion of seeing must make it possible to understand the 
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role of those experiences in enabling us to have demonstrative thoughts about what is 
perceived.  
(A), (B), and (C) together serve to explain why at least some disjunctivists take the 
metaphor of cognitive contact seriously. It is in virtue of enabling us to pick out objects in 
thought that visual perception puts us in cognitive contact with those objects and enables us 
to take in facts about those objects. If via perception there were no demonstrative thoughts 
about objects there would be no cognitive contact with those objects.  
We are now very close to the heart of the matter. But we still need to consider the 
motivation for accepting (D). The relational conception of demonstrative thought dictates a 
disjunctivist conception of the mentality which can be given expression by utterances like, 
‘That is Bill’. This disjunctivism is at the level of thought and so, one might think, not at the 
level of experience. We still need to make explicit why we should discriminate between 
essentially object-involving experiences and non-object-involving experiences. Suppose then 
that experiences were not intrinsically encounters with objects. Then the experience I have 
when I see Bill would not be intrinsically an encounter with Bill. In that case, the argument 
goes, it is not something that explains why the presence of Bill is open to view for me, 
making Bill an object about which I can have demonstrative thoughts and make 
demonstrative judgements. For since I could have the very same experience if Bill had not 
been not there, the having of that experience cannot by itself explain why I am able to have 
demonstrative thoughts, and make demonstrative judgements, about Bill.  
This helps to explain further why even psychological mediation is thought by the 
disjunctivist to be epistemologically problematic. A picture on which experiences as 
traditionally conceived psychological mediate my seeing that Bill is there is thought to put 
me at a distance from what I am supposed to know. (Recall the remarks towards the end of 
section 4 above.) This is not because experiences are encountered intermediaries. (Let’s take 
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it to be conceded that the traditionalist’s protests on that score are justified.) It is because 
experiences under the traditional conception do not explain how perception enables us to 
have demonstrative thoughts and knowledge. The relational conception of perceptual 
experiences removes the distance. My perceptual experience as I look at Bill can be an 
unmediated spotting of Bill and an unmediated taking-in of the fact that he is there.  
This serves to bring out what I take to be right in disjunctivism. The disjunctivist is right 
in thinking that we cannot adequately explain how perception enables us to pick out objects 
demonstratively simply in terms of our having experiences under the traditional conception. I 
shall assume here that the disjunctivist is also right in giving demonstrative thought a central 
place in the theory of perceptual knowledge. But there are two options by way of response to 
these concessions. One, adopted by the disjunctivist, is to suppose that we need an alternative 
conception of experience—a conception on which perceptual experiences are essentially 
relational and can therefore bear the explanatory burden placed on them by disjunctivists. 
The other, which remains open to the traditionalist, is to show that experiences do not have to 
bear the heavy explanatory burden that disjunctivists place upon them and that we can 
explain how perception makes it possible to have demonstrative thoughts and demonstrative 
knowledge even under the traditional conception. I develop the second of these options in the 
next section. 
 
6. Cognitive contact under the traditional conception 
 
The traditionalist needs to account for the asymmetry in epistemic status between 
 
(a)  a case in which a subject has a true belief that is reasonable, even though he or she is 
not in cognitive contact with the fact that makes the belief true, and,  
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(b) a corresponding case in which there is genuine cognitive contact with the fact.  
 
The situations might be, respectively, the Gettier-type example of my believing that Bill is 
there on looking at the photograph and the situation in which the setting is much the same 
except that there is no photograph and I see Bill and thereby come to know that he is there.  It 
is crucial that in the latter situation it is not simply that I am affected by the presence of Bill. I 
discriminate the object that is Bill. This is visual discrimination consisting in my being 
furnished with a flow of visual experiences that prime me to respond behaviourally to this 
object in ways that are appropriate to its size, shape, and location. It is the kind of 
discrimination that primes me not to bump into people and door posts as I walk along a 
corridor. I envisage it as being sub-doxastic, in that its outputs are not beliefs but visual 
experiences that prime me to behave in this or that way, depending on what I am doing. In 
the case in hand the exercise of capacities for visual discrimination make Bill available to me 
as a possible object of thought so that, if I suitably direct my thought, I can think about him. 
Given the appropriate recognitional capacity I am also enabled to recognise this Bill as Bill, 
so that I am primed to respond to his presence intellectually in ways appropriate to his being 
Bill. For instance, I can refer to him in conversation as being present. Both the discrimination 
and the recognition result from the exercise of capacities I have to do such things. At least 
part of the story of why, when I look at Bill, I am in cognitive contact with him, and facts 
about him, is that I have exercised those capacities. The contact, then, is not simply a matter 
of my being affected in certain ways as a result of the presence of Bill before me. It is a 
matter of being in a relational state in virtue of the exercise of those capacities. The exercise 
of the capacities is integral to my being in cognitive contact with Bill and with the fact that he 
is Bill. 
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When I look at Bill in the doorway I have an experience such that it looks to me as if Bill 
is there. The disjunctivist is right to think that having such an experience under the traditional 
conception cannot account for what enables me to discriminate Bill perceptually or recognise 
him as Bill. As suggested above, I count as having done those things only if I have exercised 
appropriate capacities. But that is not a reason for supposing that no experience under the 
traditional conception has occurred. It is simply a reason not to look for an explanation of my 
cognitive contact with Bill, and with the fact of his being present, purely in terms of the 
occurrence of the experience. My cognitive contact with Bill comes from encountering him 
perceptually, in this case by seeing him. But my seeing him is not simply my having the 
experience; nor is it my having the experience because of the presence of Bill, since, in 
Putnam’s terms, ‘a mere affectation of my subjectivity’ brought about by the presence of Bill 
falls short of being in cognitive contact with him. As suggested, it is a matter of my having 
exercised a discriminative capacity, as a result of which Bill is available to me as a possible 
object of thought, and a recognitional capacity as a result of which I recognise Bill as Bill.  
On this approach experiences undoubtedly have a role in explaining what is going on 
when I know through seeing that Bill is there. (How could it be otherwise?) Experiences 
shape the thinking that, when things go well, puts me in cognitive contact with Bill and with 
the fact that he is there. I knew that he was there by looking because I exercised an 
appropriate discriminative capacity, and thereby saw him, and exercised a recognitional 
capacity, whereby I could tell that Bill was there. My exercise of the recognitional capacity 
was a response to my having visually discriminated Bill, but the exercise did not simply 
consist in my responding to the experience thus gained with the formation of a belief. It 
consisted in my recognising something seen as Bill. The same capacity would not have been 
exercised if I had been in the Gettier situation in which the photograph interposes between 
Bill and me. So there is an important asymmetry between such a situation and that in which I 
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saw and recognised Bill. This is the asymmetry that had to be explained to do justice to the 
cognitive contact that there is in the good case.  It can be explained in keeping with the 
traditional conception. 
How should we think of the recognitional capacities on the view I have been outlining? 
Consider my capacity to tell that something is a sparrow by looking. I suggest that I have 
such a capacity in virtue of being so primed that if suitably prompted I would implement a 
certain judgement-forming procedure. Roughly speaking, the procedure is that whereby, 
under certain conditions (for instance, I don’t believe that the object is too far away, or that 
the light is too poor, or that my eyes are not up to the job in hand) I judge either that the thing 
I am looking at is a sparrow, or that it is not, by way of immediate (non-inferential) reaction 
to some range of visual experiences that I have. Implementation of the procedure might be 
prompted by my wanting to tell whether or not the thing is a sparrow or simply by my 
attention being so engaged by what I see that the relevant procedure comes into play. Though 
non-inferential, the procedure implicates certain complex sensitivities on my part. For 
instance, I am sensitive to whether or not the conditions are suitable and so to whether or not 
I have a clear enough view of what I am looking at. I am also sensitive to the possibility of 
mistaking female sparrows for females of other species. That sensitivity is informed by 
knowledge of sparrows and of other birds likely to appear in my area. Note that the role of 
such sensitivities here is compatible with the view that I tell just by looking. Telling just by 
looking contrasts with telling by inference or the weighing up of evidence. It does not rule 
out the possibility that a sophisticated recognitional capacity is deployed, which is informed 
by knowledge and past experience and issues in judgements in which rich concepts are 
applied.  
My being primed to go through the relevant judgement-forming procedure is constitutive 
of a capacity to tell by looking, under certain conditions, whether or not something is a 
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sparrow, but only in certain circumstances. The same state would not constitute the capacity 
in circumstances in which cunningly made sparrow-like flying robots are around the place, or 
in which lots of birds that are not sparrows are barely distinguishable from sparrows just by 
looking. So the capacity in question is, more strictly speaking, a capacity to tell by looking, 
under certain conditions, and in certain circumstances, that something is a sparrow. The 
relevant circumstances are such that by-and-large the implementation of the procedure, in the 
right conditions, and in those circumstances, is perceptually triggered by the presence or 
absence of a sparrow, as the case may be, and yields a true judgement as to whether or not 
something is a sparrow. For the exercise of the capacity it is not enough that the judgement-
forming procedure should be implemented and the judgement true.13 Those conditions could 
be met in some Gettier-type situation. It is crucial that the presence or absence of a sparrow 
should, via the implementation of the procedure, lead to the true judgement that the thing 
seen is or is not a sparrow. Only when that happens is the capacity exercised. Nonetheless, 
the account allows for there to be occasions when I judge by looking that some object is or is 
not a sparrow and get it wrong. (These will be relatively rare if I really do have the 
recognitional capacity in question, since part of what is involved in having this capacity is 
knowing when not to be sure, and thus not to judge either way.) The account I am suggesting 
implies that when I get it wrong the capacity in question was not exercised. Perhaps the 
judgement-forming procedure that constitutes it was implemented, but unless it was triggered 
in the usual way by the presence or absence of a sparrow, as the case may be, the subject did 
not know by looking that what is seen was or was not a sparrow.  
I see no prospect of providing a reductive analysis of the concept of knowing by looking. 
The reason is connected with our grip on what the judgement-forming procedure must be if it 
                                                
13 It is important for this point that the procedure runs from the having of the experiences to the making of a 
judgement. The presence of the object in question is not necessary for the procedure to be implemented. 
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constitutes the capacity in question. It has to be a procedure taking suitably sensitive subjects, 
in suitable circumstances, and under suitable conditions, from visual experiences within some 
range to judgements that something is or isn’t a sparrow. And it has to be a procedure the 
implementation of which reliably leads to true beliefs in some range of possible 
circumstances. But I doubt that it is possible to give a precise characterisation of the 
procedure or of the circumstances in which its implementation counts as the exercise of the 
capacity. Nonetheless, we are not in general at a loss to tell whether someone has this or that 
perceptual recognitional capacity.  We are guided by their success or otherwise at recognising 
the relevant sort of object and by what they tell us about what puts them in a position to tell 
whether an object of that sort is or is not present.  
The lack of a reductive analysis does not diminish the explanatory power of the appeal to 
recognitional capacities in explaining why someone knows on a particular occasion that 
something is so. We are interested in elucidating, for instance, what is involved in my having 
visual perceptual knowledge that Bill is there on a particular occasion. It is agreed pretty 
much on all sides that it is not enough that I should make a true judgement that he is there. 
On the present account what is required is that I should have exercised the relevant 
capacities. I could have had the relevant capacities and not exercised them, even though I 
made a true judgement that Bill is there. I could even make a true judgement that he is there 
in a circumstance in which I lack the relevant recognitional capacities. For I might simply get 
the feeling that it’s Bill, the guy I’d heard so much about, who is standing there, and judge 
accordingly. So it is informative if I have made the true judgement by way of exercising the 
recognitional capacity. Still, it might be wondered whether the account in terms of capacities 
really illuminates cognitive contact. The worry here perhaps rests on the presupposition that 
the ultimate aim of the enquiry is a reductive analytical account of seeing and of knowing 
through seeing. The defender of the traditional account of experience need not accept this 
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presupposition. As others have ably argued the traditional reductive analytical project in the 
theory of knowledge is suspect. (See especially McDowell 1995 and Williamson 2000 on 
this.) I do not think that this diminishes the philosophical value of the account. I have not 
presented the capacities I have invoked simply as those capacities, whatever they are, the 
exercise of which gives you this or that perceptual knowledge.  On the contrary, I have 
presented a view of what constitutes possession of these capacities in terms of being primed 
to implement judgement-forming procedures in a suitable environment. The account makes 
explicit that the capacities in question are individuated in such a way that they do not count as 
being exercised unless knowledge is acquired. Because they are so individuated they can 
serve to explain how cognitive contact is achievable.  
My approach to cognitive contact highlights one motivation for thinking that 
disjunctivism is an attractive view. This derives from the idea that the intrinsic character of 
the experiences implicated in perception should make it evident why having such experiences 
amounts to cognitive contact with objects or facts. This provides the motivation to think that 
a relational conception of experience is required to explain how perception links up with 
demonstrative thought, judgement, and knowledge. The disjunctivist is right to think that 
experiences under the traditional conception do not have an intrinsic character that will 
suffice to explain how perception makes demonstrative thought, judgement and knowledge 
possible.  Where the disjunctivist goes wrong is in thinking that there is no plausible 
alternative, drawing upon the traditional conception of experience. There is such an 
alternative on which experiences under the traditional conception, possessed by subjects with 
appropriate cognitive capacities, contribute to the explanation of the possibility of 
demonstrative thought, judgement and knowledge and thus to a plausible story about what 
makes for cognitive contact with objects and facts. 
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If I am right the gap between traditionalists and disjunctivists, at least on epistemological 
matters, can be narrowed. Does this mean that the difference between the traditionalist and 
the disjunctivist ceases to be of importance? There are three good reasons to think otherwise. 
The first is that the dialectical situation that I have addressed is one in which at the start there 
is a significant gap between the parties on experience and on knowledge. The narrowing is 
achieved only if the traditionalist is willing to adopt the proposed view of cognitive contact. 
This view has not routinely been a component in the traditionalist’s battery of ideas. Though 
in formulating it I have been motivated by reflection on disjunctivist thinking about cognitive 
contact, it is not the disjunctivist’s view. In particular, it does not require us to think of the 
experiences we have when perceiving as essentially relational. So notwithstanding the 
narrowing of the gap there remains a difference between the parties as to whether or not 
cognitive contact requires essentially relational experiences of the sort envisaged by 
disjunctivists. The second consideration is that it would be premature to conclude that the 
outstanding difference between traditionalists who embrace my view of cognitive contact and 
disjunctivists—the difference concerning whether perceptual experiences are essentially 
relational—is of no significance. Disjunctivists think that epistemological danger lurks if it is 
conceded to the traditionalist that perception implicates experiences under the traditional 
conception. On the view I have presented, which traditionalists may adopt, there is no such 
danger. That looks like a significant difference. The third consideration is that it is not only 
epistemology that has divided disjunctivists and traditionalists about experience. There are 
issues in the philosophy of mind about the very intelligibility of the traditional conception, 
which I have not explored here.14 Even if the difference between traditionalists and 
                                                
14 I have in mind the sorts of issues explored in Martin 2004. 
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disjunctivists on experience were a side-show so far as epistemology is concerned, it would 
remain an open question what these further issues amount to.15 
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